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The Near East Foundation (NEF) declared in 1934 that it aimed to achieve a “full round 
of life for all” through its work in the Near East.  A report explained that a full life included 
“health and hygiene for individual and community, economic security through effective 
agriculture and industry, happy homes with rights and opportunities for childhood and 
womanhood, the brotherhood and co-operation of national and racial and religious groups, and 
above all the fullness of culture and spiritual faith.”1  These goals reflected NEF’s hopes for a 
full social transformation in the Middle East, and show the growing influence of development 
ideology on its leadership.  They also reflected major changes in NEF’s goals from its origins as 
a relief organization. 
Expanding its vision of aid from emergency survival to creating a “full round of life” 
helped Near East Relief (NER) transform itself from a wartime humanitarian aid society into a 
professional development agency.  This transformation did not come easily or immediately.  
Internal conflicts within NER during the late 1920s highlight that reorganization required 
changes in both personnel and the organization’s theories of social uplift.  However, by the early 
1930s, the new NEF had reorganized staff and fundraising.  It emphasized new core priorities to 
transform whole societies instead of aiding individuals or groups in need.  The organization’s 
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leaders embraced social science metrics and began considering economic, as well as moral and 
social uplift.  Ultimately, the NEF’s move from wartime aid to development assistance marked a 
key shift in American involvement in the Middle East from religious uplift to social 
transformation.
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 NER’s emergency humanitarian aid during World War I got Americans involved in the 
Near East on a massive scale.  Several relief committees quickly formed when reports on 
violence toward Armenians began reaching the United States.  These merged into the American 
Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE) in 1915, which was incorporated as NER in 
1919.  ACRNE and NER used massive public fundraising campaigns and religious fundraising 
networks in the United States to collect millions of dollars for refugees.  Publicity campaigns 
also brought in warehouses full of donated clothes and nonperishable goods.  James Barton, 
Foreign Secretary of the Congregational Missions Board, served as the chairman of NER’s 
Executive Committee, the group that set policy and oversaw the organization.  He and others 
such as Robert Speer and John Mott helped to ensure NER’s cooperation with religious 
organizations and missionaries operating in Turkey, Syria, and across the Near East.  NER staff 
built close ties to the U.S. government; several U.S. Army personnel were seconded to NER to 
direct relief programs, and the U.S. Navy provided invaluable help with transportation for people 
and goods as well.  NER collaborated with Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Administration in 
the Caucasus and received tons of supplies through their channels.  Powerful political figures 
such as Hoover, William Howard Taft, Charles Evans Hughes, and Elihu Root served on the 
Board of Trustees.
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 This aid helped keep hundreds of thousands of refugees alive during and after WW I.  At 
first, the organization focused specifically on aiding Armenians and other Christian minorities 
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uprooted by the war and the Armenian Genocide.  NER donated food and clothes to the 
displaced and helped protect and shelter minorities all across eastern Anatolia, Armenia, and 
Syria.  Even in the winter and spring of 1920, internal figures estimated that NER distributed 
food to more than half a million people.  NER leaders also claimed that at least a million people 
across the region survived World War I and its aftermath due to their assistance.
4
  Hundreds of 
Americans fanned out across the region, beginning in port cities, but gradually expanding their 
distribution networks into the interior.  NER’s ground operations used a mix of full-time relief 
workers and loaned or part-time workers from missionary or philanthropic organizations already 
operating in the Near East.  As funding and personnel grew, the organization’s programs and 
influence expanded to match.  NER began funding non-Christian refugees as well, a major shift 
for an organization founded with a Christian appeal.  In another decision with long-term 
implications, NER also founded or took over dozens of orphanages across the entire region.  In 
many cases, orphan work was unplanned as an organizational goal, but taken up when workers 
on the ground saw a need.  By 1920, NER estimated its orphanages housed 54,000 children and 
provided meals or partial care for 48,000 more orphans or needy children who lived near relief 
centers.
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 Three leaders predominated in shaping the early policy of ACRNE and NER during and 
immediately after WW I.  Cleveland H. Dodge helped launch ACRNE by tireless fundraising 
and generous use of his own substantial fortune.  The Dodge family had longstanding ties to the 
Near East and to American philanthropy, and Dodge was a close friend and political adviser to 
Woodrow Wilson.  He was also a devout Presbyterian who melded his belief in practical 
philanthropy with a drive to advance the Kingdom of God.  Dodge found an ally in James Barton.  
Both men came to relief work in the Near East largely out of a sense of religious and national 
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duty to the region’s Christian populations.6  Charles Vickrey was NER’s third pre-eminent early 
administrator.  He served as the organization’s General Secretary, and spent a great deal of time 
traveling in the Near East to assess conditions, talk with NER’s in-country staff, and meet with 
State Department officials and local government leaders.  Henry Morgenthau played an 
important role in starting ACRNE and raising public awareness of the relief crisis, but his 
involvement began decreasing as early as 1918 or 1919. 
 Originally, NER’s predecessor organizations envisioned their work as primarily crisis-
based.  They would ameliorate the immediate need and then draw their work to a close.  Much of 
ACRNE’s wartime aid aimed at helping refugees survive, without a lingering sense of obligation.  
This focus more or less fit with the temporary, disaster-relief model of humanitarian work 
developed during the nineteenth century and expanded during WWI.
7
  American relief work in 
Western Europe operated with a similar framework for temporary aid, and both the government-
run ARA and private relief programs steadily drew down their work and departed by 1923.  By 
1920, NER’s Executive Committee declared, “The committee should seek to withdraw 
completely from general relief work with the coming harvest and should leave to the 
governments in control of the areas, as largely as possible, all responsibility for repatriation and 
rehabilitation expenses.”8  The organization’s leaders particularly hoped to cease distributing 
direct aid in the form of food or monetary aid as soon as possible.  They accepted the need for 
some continuing work over the next few years, particularly with orphans.  NER sought a twenty-
five-year term of incorporation from Congress in 1919 as a hedge for those sorts of long-term 
possibilities.  Yet NER still hoped to turn long-term work over to governments or to religious 
organizations operating permanently in the region.
9
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 Events in the Near East, long term-commitments to orphans and refugees, and the lure of 
achieving long-term social change overturned NER’s original plans.  Famine conditions and 
violence in the Near East continued long after the official October 30, 1918 armistice between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Allies.  Allied troops occupied Constantinople and areas of the 
Anatolian coastline, but violence against Armenians continued in the interior.  In Syria, political 
and social turmoil during Faisal ibn Husein’s brief rule and the subsequent French takeover 
meant delays in turning refugee work over to a local government.  NER’s operations in the 
Russian and Armenian Caucasus region supported both Armenian refugees and Russians caught 
in the chaos and civil war following the Russian Revolution.   
Fighting and the need for aid increased in 1921 and 1922 as Turkish Nationalists began 
resisting the Allies.  Greek forces occupied Smyrna, and clashes between irregular forces 
scattered through Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus escalated once again.  A new wave of 
Armenian refugees needed food, shelter, and resettlement.  Tens of thousands of ethnic Greeks 
living in Anatolia fled the advancing Turkish Nationalists, culminating in September 1922 with a 
massive evacuation from the burned-out ruins of Smyrna.  Tens of thousands more people were 
uprooted in the 1923 population exchanges between Greece and Turkey.  The exchanges forced 
ethnic Greeks out of Turkey and ethnic Turks out of Greece, straining the ability of both 
governments to cope with the new refugees and accompanying social and political upheaval.  
Given these circumstances, NER administrators felt they could not draw down aid as originally 
planned.  Early in 1920, the Board of Trustees admitted “with the present unsettled political 
conditions in the Near East we cannot wholly withdraw the support [from refugees and orphans] 
without disastrous consequences.”10  An Executive Committee report to the Trustees in January 
1921 still promised a rapid end to general relief.  Yet that report also noted NER still had more 
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than five hundred workers deployed in the field.
11
  By February 1920, NER was already planning 
survey visits by Barton and other organization leaders to determine what aid projects would need 
long-term continued support.   
Even without new outbreaks of violence, NER’s huge population of orphans rapidly 
forced the organization to re-evaluate the length and scope of its proposed commitments.  Once 
begun, orphan relief had rapidly grown into a cornerstone of NER’s work.  Images of starving 
orphans were central to NER’s appeals for aid.  During WW I and its immediate aftermath, NER 
framed its work with orphans as vital to the long-term survival of Christian minorities in the 
Near East.  The organization painted orphan relief as part of conjoined Christian and American 
responsibilities to the needy.
12
  “Rescue” programs to find and claim Christian girls forced into 
marrying Muslims fit this rhetoric and added to NER’s commitments.  NER administrators then 
found themselves with practical and ideological constraints against abandoning their charges. 
Taking care of thousands of children would be a long-term proposition.  Orphanages took 
in children of all ages, including thousands under the age of five.  The vast majority were 
Armenian, often very far removed from their original homes and any remaining extended family.  
NER tried hard to draw down its orphan population through transfers to government support and 
outplacement programs and set an aging-out cutoff at sixteen years old, after which an orphan 
was expected to find a job and housing on his or her own.  Still, particularly with the youngest 
children, NER faced the prospect of a decade or more of continued care.  The Executive 
Committee recognized this by appointing Ernest Riggs, a Congregational missionary, as the 
Educational Director for its orphanages.  Riggs worked with staff members of the American 
colleges in the Near East and with Paul Monroe of Columbia University (a noted expert in rural 
education and modernizing educational systems) to design some sort of long-term plan for the 
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orphans.  Orphanages would remain a major part of NER’s vision and budget through the rest of 
the decade. 
Accepting long-term responsibilities for orphans allowed NER administrators to begin 
dreaming of permanently transforming Near Eastern societies.  By early 1920, at least some of 
the individuals on the Executive Committee began agitating for a more expansive vision of 
orphan care.  Charles Vickrey wanted American expertise to turn NER’s orphans into a new 
generation of Near Eastern leaders.  He proclaimed,  
“It may be doubted if any American organization has ever had an opportunity equal to 
ours in shaping the future of the Near East.  The 100,000 children now under our care, 
wisely guided will become the leaders in a New Era in the Old World.  They will be the 
trained agriculturalists, the mechanics, merchants, manufacturers, bankers, educators, 
lawyers, doctors, governors and national leaders of the New Near East.”13   
 
Vickrey’s dream would entail years of extensive work and investment in infrastructure and 
personnel.  It would require NER to take up some of the goals for social transformation that had, 
until that point, been the purview of missionary schools.  Armed with this new transformative 
vision, NER’s educational and orphanage experts began designing a regimen that focused 
heavily on industrial and vocational training in addition to academic work.  Vickrey launched a 
major campaign in 1923, International Golden Rule Sunday, designed to raise money for NER’s 
orphanage work and foster “a new generation of Golden Rule children with higher ideals of 
unselfish service leading to a New Near East and a better world.”14  
Beyond just training orphans and aiding refugees, NER’s leaders began to explicitly 
envision their work as vital for guiding the Near East to a new and better future and to connect 
that vision to practical efforts for modernization and social change.  To an extent, a vision for 
guiding the future of the Near East had always been implicit in NER’s aid to Christian minorities.  
NER, like many American missionaries in the Near East, had hopes that Christian communities 
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(once infused with Protestant vitality and modern scientific knowledge) could lead the Near East 
to a better future.  NER’s early appeals emphasized Armenia’s long history as a Christian nation 
and Armenians’ racial superiority over their Muslim neighbors.  However, by 1923, NER 
worked with a wider range of racial and religious populations.  The organization’s leaders began 
thinking of ways to use these new constituencies in shaping the region’s future.  They began 
moving farther away from an explicitly Christian vision of a new Middle East, though Christian 
identity would still permeate the organization at least through the 1930s. 
Equally important, several new leaders joined Barton and Dodge in guiding NER policy 
in new directions.  Thomas Jesse Jones brought his experience as an early sociologist and race 
expert to NER, serving on a number of committees in the mid-and late-1920s.  Jones, who served 
as Education Director of the Phelps-Stokes Foundation, was a prominent advocate of rural 
education and development.  He pushed for rural extension programs and vocational industrial 
work based on the Hampton Institute/Tuskeegee model of practical development for backwards 
people.
15
  Paul Monroe served on several committees as an expert on education and on the Near 
East; he also had experience and extensive connections through advising the Iraqi and Jordanian 
governments on creating a new school system.  Most importantly, Barclay Acheson moved up 
from working in the field to direct overseas operations in 1921.  Acheson, a Presbyterian 
clergyman and former instructor at the American University of Beirut, held a variety of 
Executive Committee and administrative posts during the 1920s.  He was more directly involved 
with field operations than most of the Executive Committee.  His growing influence over policy 
moved NER into rural extension work and away from a strictly emergency program.  Cleveland 
H. Dodge died in 1926 and his son Cleveland E. Dodge assumed his place among NER’s leaders.  
After years assisting his father in administering NER and his family’s philanthropic interests, 
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Cleveland E. Dodge’s rise meant a nearly seamless transition of organizational leadership as he 
continued his father’s push for a new type of relief work. 
By 1924 NER faced a clear moment of decision.  Most fighting had ended.  Stable 
governments were in place or forming in Turkey, Greece, Armenia, Bulgaria, and Syria, NER’s 
major operating areas.  NER administrators noted new budget constraints.  Fundraising appeals 
no longer brought in as much money as they did during the war or immediate refugee crises, so 
the organization would have to contract or refocus its work in the field.  Refugees and orphans 
still needed assistance, and clearly would for years to come, but most of the organization’s 
leaders welcomed the chance to re-assess their work and decide what directions they should 
focus on in the future.  Even as some on NER’s Executive Committee pushed for “a simplified 
constructive program, centering as largely as possible in orphanage, industrial training, and 
child-welfare work,” others, such as Acheson and Dodge, began to push for a bigger attempt to 
change the religious and social framework of Near East societies.
16
  A massive project to survey 
American philanthropy and local needs throughout the Near East became a battleground between 
factions. 
NER’s survey project, first proposed in 1924 and completed in 1927, marked a key 
moment in the organization’s transition to a permanent entity focused on development rather 
than emergency aid.  Struggles over applying its findings also revealed personal and ideological 
splits in the NER leadership.   The way NER conducted the survey revealed the organization’s 
emerging focus on economic and social problems.  The information collected, focusing heavily 
on government policies, economic conditions, and social needs, showed the increasing influence 
of social science methodology and theory in shaping the ways Americans sought to exert 
influence over the region. 
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The survey sprang from a November 1924 meeting of NER leaders and the 
administrators of American colleges and missionary institutions held in Constantinople.  All 
agreed that new political, economic, social, and religious conditions in the Near East required 
them to reassess what they knew of local societies and to reformulate their work to meet current 
needs.  The recommendations emerging from that meeting structured the questions and issues in 
the survey.  NER would do the primary organizing and compiling, though Americans working 
for missionary boards, the YMCA and YWCA, medical institutions, and schools would all 
contribute by assessing local conditions and compiling figures.  NER leaders would make no 
final decision about the future of their organization until the survey was over.
17
  The Executive 
Committee approved the survey in early 1925, and planning began in earnest. 
The survey committee hoped to put American philanthropy in the Near East on a 
scientific basis and establish long-term goals.  As their final report claimed, the survey “was 
undertaken on the assumption that programs and policies can only be developed intelligently in 
the light of all the pertinent facts, a matter-of-fact procedure that is a commonplace in business 
and industry but has been little utilized in planning the work of social agencies.”18  NER put 
together a committee of outsiders to run its survey, hoping for impartiality and an outsiders’ 
perspective.  Participating in the survey committee brought Monroe and Jones into close contact 
with NER, though both had been occasionally involved before.  The survey committee also 
reached out to experts in social science research to help compile and apply their findings.  They 
hired Dr. Frank A. Ross, a statistics expert at Columbia University, C. Luther Fry of the 
Rockefeller-funded Institute of Social and Religious Research, and Elbridge Sibley, a sociology 
graduate student, also at Columbia University, to travel abroad and write the final report.  Their 
involvement highlights a larger trend for NER in the mid-1920s, in which academic experts and 
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professional aid workers began to participate, even to dominate, in advisory committees and 
research groups. 
The survey had both practical and larger, more ideological components.  Part of the 
survey work aimed simply to inventory NER assets to identify unnecessary projects and material, 
resulting in detailed reports of property, personnel, and goods.  Other parts of the report 
catalogued the American religious and philanthropic enterprises already operating in the region, 
but reports also covered political, economic, and social conditions in countries across the Near 
East.  NER collected information about transportation networks, imports and exports, agriculture, 
tax policies, health and sanitation, education, demographic change, women’s rights, and 
religious/racial divides in each country’s social matrix.  Americans in the Near East had long 
worked on these problems as part of their missionary outreach, particularly education, health, 
and women’s rights.  However, the survey pointed to an emerging emphasis on economic well-
being and social transformation that transcended evangelization, targeted work with Christian 
minorities, or short-term aid.   
The survey reports, as well as discussions at the 1927 Constantinople conference that put 
together the results, exacerbated tensions within the organization’s leadership.  According to 
Acheson, by early 1927 several distinct factions within the NER leadership were becoming clear.  
One, led by Charles Vickrey, organized around continuing work along current orphan-care lines, 
using Golden Rule fundraising tactics, and focusing on Christian minorities.  Another, centered 
on John Mace, largely departed or was forced out of NER by Vickrey after they rejected his 
fundraising program and his leadership style, though they wanted a similar agenda of continued 
work with orphans in the field.  Many from this group joined the growing Near East Colleges 
Association.  A third group led by John Voris sought to turn NER into “a kind of 
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interdenominational mission board.”19  Apart from these groups, Acheson began building a loose 
coalition with Jones and some of the other philanthropic experts.  Barton also worked with them 
over the next several years. 
Barton, Acheson and others on the Executive Committee began pushing Vickrey out of 
the leadership at NER.  Vickrey had a chance in March 1927 to win the Executive Committee 
over to his scheme for a new Golden Rule-based organizational agenda and fundraising plan, but 
he failed to convince the other factions.  NER would continue using Golden Rule publicity 
appeals temporarily, but started splitting off that part of the organization.  Acheson admitted that 
NER leadership remained divided after the survey.  Jones, Monroe, and others all advocated 
different variants of new programs—“each, like a great surgeon, is inclined to think that his 
particular hobby is the panacea for the world’s ills.”20  Acheson however, stated in a rare burst of 
emotion that he conceived the core “of the present problem as being THE DEMONSTRATION 
OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR A PERMANENT ORGANIZATION TO DO 
WORK OF A SOCIAL SERVICE AND COMMUNITY SCHOOL CHARACTER [emphasis 
original].”21  Acheson’s vision and leadership would be heavily reflected in NER’s coming 
reorganization. 
The survey findings led to NER creating the Conservation Committee in October 1928.  
The Committee began with a small, picked body of seven NER administrators and experts, 
including Cleveland E. Dodge, Barton, Jones, Monroe, and Acheson.  These men, many of 
whom had been intimately connected with conducting the survey, set out to find what parts of 
NER should be conserved into a new, permanent offspring organization.  A discussion during the 
first meeting affirmed the decision of everyone in the group to keep working in the Near East, 
arguing that “America had a tremendous contribution to make” for the region and its future.22  
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The Committee was originally set up as an advisory body to the Executive Committee, but by 
July 1929 this group began setting the organizational policies that a lame-duck Executive 
Committee would implement.  By early 1930, the Conservation Committee had closed many 
NER state committees and offices, cut staff, and began the transition to a new organization 
named the Near East Foundation.  NER would remain as a shadow organization to manage 
bequests and investments until its Congressional incorporation term ended in 1944, but NEF took 
over and expanded NER’s early work to develop the Near East. 
NEF continued the orphanage work NER had prized so highly, but placed greater 
emphasis on trained professionals overseeing long-term projects to raise the social and economic 
standards of whole communities.  As contemplated in 1930, NEF’s mission was “To work with 
the people of the Near East to discover and remove the causes of their poverty, disease and 
retarded development,” to alleviate conditions from “ignorance, famine, pestilence, and war … 
To create in Near East communities a consciousness of the needs of their neglected childhood 
and womanhood … To raise the standard of living in villages and rural communities by a non-
institutional, extension program of education.”23  NER had already begun experimenting with 
rural extension work to teach farming, nursing, and hygiene in Macedonia and the Caucasus 
during the late 1920s.  Harold Allen put together a team of American and Greek agricultural 
experts operating demonstration centers and lecture series in a number of Macedonian villages.  
Similar projects flourished under new NEF auspices, including rural extension programs in 
Turkey, Lebanon, Bulgaria, and Albania, and teacher-training work in Palestine.  The scale of 
this new work was considerably less than NER at its height.  Where NER in the early 1920s 
averaged nearly twelve million dollars each year in incoming funds, NEF’s budget for projects 
and salaries during the years 1930-1933 averaged just over $400,000 per year.
24
  Yet the 
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organization’s scope of activity and its vision for the Near East was, in many ways, broader than 
ever before. 
NEF used emerging social science methods and concepts of economic well-being to 
quantify, shape, and explain its work.  Where reports and publicity materials from the early 
1920s focused particularly on emotional stories of children redeemed and individuals rescued, 
NEF’s publicity and internal materials included many more maps, diagrams, and tables that 
illustrated and quantified projects and results.  Making this switch required mental and 
organizational changes among the NER leaders.  A 1929 report admitted “we have also found 
that the discovery and use of what might be called a “social yardstick” in educational, health, 
child welfare, and other lines is almost as difficult as the discovery and use of a naval yardstick 
in disarmament conferences.  Social progress has not yet invented a system of weights and 
measures and we are without precedent.”25  The Conservation Committee and then the NEF 
leadership asked experts at the Institute of Social and Religious Research to help set up a 
research department that would produce some of the needed data.  They also increasingly sought 
to hire or promote experts with “modern training” in agriculture, economics, healthcare, or 
recreation to study social needs and help evaluate ongoing progress.
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By 1934, NEF sought to achieve a “full round of life for all” through its work in the Near 
East.   NEF still aided refugees and orphans, even providing some direct financial assistance or 
food aid when needed, but in the NEF, Jones, Acheson, Monroe and their allies clearly had larger 
social transformations in sight.  They assumed that experiences and expertise from American 
development could be normative as the model for the world.  NEF would continue to develop its 
new programs through the 1930s, struggling to raise funds and navigating tricky relationships 
with nationalist movements and resistant local leaders.  The organization’s evolution would 
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continue into the 1940s and beyond as it continued to work in the Near East and increasingly in 
Africa.  President Truman cited NEF’s work as one of the models for his Point Four program, 
highlighting ties between early development experiments and the era of “high modernization” to 
come.
27
  In its search for a “social yardstick” and in organizing a permanent, professional staff, 
NEF foreshadowed many of the issues that other American development organizations (public 
and private) would deal with during the 1940s and 1950s.   
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